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Introduction 
1. THE ETHICS OF BELIEF AND THE NORMS OF AGENCY 
The way we think and talk about beliefs reveals that our doxastic practices 
are infused with normative judgments. For example, we express disapproval 
and approval for each other's beliefs; we ask in an incredulous tone, "How 
can you believe that?" or exclaim, "What a ridiculous thing to believe!" 
We seem to think that one's actual belief can deviate from how one ought 
to believe, just as we think one can act in a way that deviates from how one 
ought to act. The broad question asked under the heading of "The Ethics of 
Belief" is: What ought one believe? The dominant view among contemporary 
philosophers is that the only good reasons for believing are evidential, namely 
reasons based on evidence. I will call this view "evidentialism." On this view, 
the only legitimate criticism of belief is that it violates evidential norms and 
any belief formed against the evidence is impermissible. I will use the term 
"pragmatism" to refer to the opposed view that some non-evidentially based 
beliefs are permissible and that doxastic norms are not wholly evidential. 1 
Pragmatists can allow that most beliefs that violate evidential norms are 
impermissible but deny that the only relevant considerations when assessing 
beliefs are evidential. One central aim of this book is to defend pragmatism 
as I have here defined it. 
One way of framing the question of what norms guide belief is to compare 
them to the norms that guide action, which are often treated as unproblem-
atic; the question is whether the norms that guide belief are the same as, 
related to, or wholly different from the norms that guide action. Of course, 
the question of what norms guide action is not unproblematic. The entire 
field of normative ethics would not exist if it were. But despite deep divisions 
and debate about how to evaluate actions, broad agreement exists that if one 
engages in practical reasoning, this should include thinking about the dictates 
of morality and prudence. We should think about what principles guide our 
actions, what the consequences of our actions are likely to be, and what our 
actions say about our characters. It is difficult to provide a fully articulated 
theory as to which principles matter most, or what the ultimate grounds 
are for such principles. Some theorists think the project of articulating such 
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general principles is misguided. But we at least know what area, broadly 
speaking, to look in when making these practical determinations. I will refer 
to the norms that guide action as the "norms of agency." 
If we were wondering what norms governed the game of chess, we would 
not turn to the norms that guide action. We would need instead to examine 
this specific practice, figure out how one plays the game, how one wins, 
consult the rule book, or ask an expert. A particular decision I make when 
playing the game might be based on moral or prudential considerations. 
For example, one might decide not to take the queen yet because, in doing 
so, one's novice opponent would be embarrassed. But such considerations 
are irrelevant in trying to determine what counts as a permissible chess move. 
Most contemporary theorists think that the norms of belief are analogous 
to the norms of chess; to appeal to the norms of agency in thinking about how 
to believe, they think, is to make a category mistake. Beliefs are not actions 
and so should not be assessed according to the same criteria. In assessing 
a belief, the relevant criteria, it is argued, are a/ethic or epistemic. In believ-
ing, we seek to gain truth (or, more importantly, avoid falsehood), and so 
when we believe for reasons that are opposed to truth-gaining or falsehood-
avoidance, we can be criticized for violating these norms. While there is 
some disagreement about the precise relationship between belief and truth, 
very few people fundamentally question the view that beliefs require their 
own separate ethics.2 The central contention of this book is that they do not; 
that, instead, the ethics of belief and action are unified. The norms of agency 
apply to both action and belief. 
In arguing for a disparity between the norms of action and belief, many the-
orists argue that to understand what norms guide a practice, one must inves-
tigate the aim or purpose of the practice. The norms provide rules that help 
one achieve this aim. I assess your skill as a cyclist by appealing to standards 
of ideal bicycle riding, for example being able to use your bicycle with maxi-
mum efficiency so that you expend minimal effort to travel far and fast. The 
idea that one assesses an x based on x's function is found clearly articulated in 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: 
For just as the good, i.e., [doing] well for a flautist, a sculptor, and every 
craftsman, and in general, for whatever has a function and [character-
istic] action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true 
for a human being, if a human being has some function. 3 
The idea of extending this teleological framework to humans in general is 
something most contemporary theorists reject. Yet, extending this framework 
to include beliefs has typically not been viewed as problematic. In assessing 
whether someone is believing well, it is argued, we must look at the function 
(aim, purpose) of belief. While we shall see this aim is characterized some-
what differently depending on the specific account given, most are variations 
on the theme that beliefs aim at truth. 
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That belief aims at truth is supposed to be an explanatory hypothesis. 4 
First, if one thinks that a successful belief is a true one, then the truth-aim 
hypothesis will explain why this is so. Just as an archer is successful when 
his arrow hits the literal target, so, too, a believer is successful when his 
belief hits the target of truth. The truth-aim hypothesis can also explain why 
we cannot believe at will. We cannot choose what is true5 and if beliefs, in 
some sense, are conceptually tied to truth, then this shows why we cannot 
choose what to believe. In recent years, there have been many attempts to 
illuminate the conceptual connection between belief and truth. A better 
understanding of the truth-aim, it is argued, can make normative statements 
about belief less mysterious. If it turns out to be a fact about our cognitive 
systems that beliefs aim at truth, then it can also be a fact that false beliefs 
are incorrect. Knowing the purpose for which a machine is designed allows 
us to make normative claims about the machine. If my car won't start and so 
cannot serve its purpose of transporting me, something is wrong with my car. 
So, it is argued, understanding the purpose of the "belief-forming machine" 
allows us to assess how well or poorly the "machine" is functioning. 
Thinking of believing as analogous to chess playing or bicycle riding is 
problematic. What you believe is at least as central to who you are as how you 
act (and, of course, how you act is connected in fundamental ways to what 
you believe). Even if we eschew talk of a distinctive human function, we can 
take from Aristotle that the best (most excellent, virtuous) human will always 
act correctly, but such an ideal person will also always believe correctly and 
feel correctly.6 The implications of accepting this unity between action, belief, 
and feeling is one of the themes I will be exploring throughout this work. 
I have been referring to "norms" for belief, but what do I mean when 
I claim there are such norms and how, if at all, are these related to rules for 
believing or to the aim or goal of belief? What concerns me when thinking 
about norms for belief is primarily the criteria of assessment or evaluation 
of belief. I am asking what criteria distinguish a belief being good or permis-
sible from a belief being bad or impermissible. One way of approaching this 
question is to think about what the aim or goal is and then evaluate beliefs 
according to how well they achieve this goal. I will be examining many such 
approaches and arguing that they are flawed. This is not to say that such 
reflection cannot help deepen our understanding of the doxastic norms, but 
one cannot, as some argue, identify one aim or goal that then provides us with 
the norm. Thinking about rules that tend to guide us in forming and main-
taining beliefs can also help in furthering our understanding of belief norms, 
but they cannot be identified with them. Any rule explicitly articulated will 
be an evidentialist one such as, "if one's current evidence is against a proposi-
tion, one ought not believe it" but, I will argue, that it is possible for a belief 
to be permissible even if it violates one of these rules. By contrast, it makes no 
sense to say that a move in chess is permissible even if it violates the rules of 
chess. Many evidentialists go wrong in thinking that evidentialist rules apply 
absolutely, rather than in general. 
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2. SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
David Hume is one of the historical figures most commonly invoked in 
defending evidentialism. 7 Hume's statement, "a wise man ... proportions his 
belief to the evidence. " 8 is often taken to summarize the evidentialist view. 
Hume does think, in general, that believing well means believing accord-
ing to evidentialist rules-what can be termed "the rules of the wise"-but 
Hume, famously, recognizes that if one were to universally follow these 
rules, one could find oneself with no beliefs at all. The belief that one should 
proportion one's belief to the evidence, for example, is not one that can, 
without circularity, be evidentially grounded; this is the case with many of 
our most basic framework beliefs. So, when Hume puts forth his evidential-
ist dicta, it is within this accepted, though ultimately rationally ungrounded, 
framework. And the reason why we should proportion our belief to the 
evidence is, I argue, for Hume, ultimately practical. 
Some may take Hume's evaluation of beliefs as purely descriptive. He has 
described a prevalent and important human practice, namely the practice of 
reasoning. This practice has developed with certain rules so that we can dis-
tinguish good reasoning from bad. We can say, according to the reasoning 
game, that this belief is more warranted than that one, and that those who 
follow the rules of the game correctly are epistemically responsible. That is, 
we can say the "wise," who play the reasoning game well, proceed in this 
way and form beliefs on this basis. But it seems Hume wants to go beyond 
mere description. He thinks it is better to follow reason, and strive to be 
wise, than to stick with vulgar, unreasonable habits. What is the nature of 
Hume's approval for the wise person? 
One answer to the question as to why we should regulate our beliefs 
according to evidentialist rules is that doing so can provide us true beliefs or 
knowledge. This answer does not take us very far. For it seems we can just 
as easily ask the question, "Why should we want true beliefs?" as we can 
ask, "Why should we be wise?" Instead, Hume's preference for reason is 
given a moral justification. The wise have the virtues of reasonableness and, 
so, excite our moral approbation.9 According to Hume, a person's virtue 
"consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable 
to the person himself or others. "10 He provides examples of each kind in 
considering a paragon of virtue named Cleanthes. Cleanthes's benevolence 
is useful to others, his assiduousness useful to himself, his wit and gallantry 
agreeable to others, and his tranquility of soul agreeable to himself. 
Hume seems to think that one can locate the main source of approval 
for the various mental qualities we call virtues as falling predominantly into 
one of these four categories. The approval felt toward the mental quality of 
the wise, it seems, stems more from the wise person's character being useful 
to society than from it being agreeable to the possessor or others, or even 
useful to the possessor. I think Hume's preference and recommendation for 
following reason is politically motivated. The point is that the world will be 
a better place if more people choose reason as their guide. 
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While Hume is taken as the evidentialist's historic exemplar, he recognized 
the limits of evidentialism, a recognition that eludes many contemporary 
theorists. They form theories about belief that seem primarily aimed at clos-
ing off all gaps so that no non-evidentially based belief can sneak in as 
legitimate. As we shall see, one strategy for such gap-sealing is to argue that 
it is conceptually impossible to believe against the evidence. 11 
For much of the twentieth century, most philosophers seem to have 
thought there is no question concerning norms for belief distinct from that 
of what constitutes a belief's justification. During that time when "The Ethics 
of Belief" was discussed, it would usually refer historically to the nineteenth-
century debate between W. K. Clifford and William James. In Clifford's paper 
"The Ethics of Belief," he insists that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for 
any one, to believe anything on insufficient evidence" and that we have a duty 
to withhold beliefs for which we do not have evidence. In James's "The Will 
to Believe," James responds directly to Clifford's strong evidentialist stance. 
He agrees that in many contexts evidential considerations will settle the mat-
ter of what to believe, but when questions cannot be decided by the evidence, 
James says it is permissible to let our "passional nature" take over, and for 
our beliefs to depend partly on what will help us make sense of ourselves and 
our world, on what will provide us with meaning, or even on what will give 
us peace and solace. Thus, for James, at least some of the norms governing 
belief are practical. 
In the past decade, this debate has been revived, and the question of 
whether it is ever permissible to believe against the evidence has once again 
become a live question. Though it is never simple to account for what brings 
a question back into philosophical fashion, one likely reason for this revival is 
that there was a perceived need to answer "Reformed epistemologists" who 
defend religious belief by saying that beliefs are sometimes justified even if 
one has no evidence for them. 12 For example, Jonathan Adler explicitly states 
that his motivation for his defense of a very strong version of evidentialism 
came after engaging with these anti-evidentialist arguments. 13 If Adler is 
right that the concept of belief guarantees the truth of evidentialism, then 
the guiding question of the ethics of belief is misleading. There is no question 
about what I ought to believe beyond what I must believe; to say I believe 
something though I lack evidence for it, Adler says, is incoherent. But the 
price Adler pays for this victory is that he has committed us to widespread 
error in many of our doxastic practices.14 An alternative is to allow that 
some beliefs are not based on evidence and then figure out when such beliefs 
are pernicious and when they are not. So doing would allow us to respond 
to the anti-evidentialist arguments Adler considers without committing us to 
the view that our doxastic practices are fundamentally confused. 15 
Just as Hume is seen as the historic founder of evidentialism, those who 
argue that there can be good practical reasons to believe independent of 
one's evidence turn for inspiration to Pascal's claim that the best reason to 
form a belief in God was a practical one, namely the possibility of avoiding 
eternal suffering. 16 Similarly, part of J ames's motivation was to defend 
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a certain religious perspective. However, opposition to evidentialism need 
not be motivated by the desire to defend religion: consider Hume, who, 
I've argued, should be understood as a pragmatist. For while Hume says 
a wise man ought to proportion his belief to the evidence, he also sees that 
for some of our most central beliefs, for example our belief in external 
objects, "experience is and must be entirely silent." Yet he does not think 
this belief should, or could, be abandoned: "Nature is always too strong for 
principle. " 17 If we think of belief as isolated, narrow, and purely intellectual 
instead of as deeply entwined with our emotions, desires, and well-being, 
then we ignore who we are. Recognizing and accepting this complexity will 
allow us the proper kind of reflection and, when needed, correction. 
I have been discussing evidentialism as if it applies uniquely to one view 
although, as we shall see, many different views can be termed evidentialist. 
One may think that being an evidentialist does not prohibit one from seeing 
evidential norms as grounded in practical or moral ones, and that one may 
only mean that we should follow evidence because things will go better 
for us. Given that I agree that evidential norms are most often the ones to 
follow, perhaps I could be classified as a moderate evidentialist. There are 
different ways one could classify these positions. I have termed any posi-
tion "pragmatist" that allows that some non-evidentially based beliefs have 
nothing wrong with them. It seems that, despite the differences among con-
temporary evidentialists, they would all reject that view. I will argue that 
whereas having true beliefs is extremely important, the truth of a proposition 
does not always count in favor of believing it; holding some non-evidentially 
based beliefs is possible, permissible, and need not be irresponsible. 
The challenge to the pragmatist view I defend is to allow us to distinguish 
pernicious non-evidentially based beliefs from those that are permissible. 
The challenge, in other words, is to show that abandoning strict evidential-
ism does not simply allow one to believe whatever will make one happy. 
I argue that a number of constraints can be placed on when it is permissible 
to violate evidentialist rules. Given my view that the norms of agency guide 
both action and belief, these constraints will be the similar to those that 
prohibit one from acting in any way that makes one happy. 
3. A WORD ON METHODOLOGY: WHAT IS 
A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION? 
One of my main criticisms of evidentialism is that the phenomenon evidentialists 
call "belief" bears little resemblance to what we ordinarily think of as belief; 
its complexity is diminished, its scope and purpose narrowed. But, what do 
I mean by "belief?" I will say more about this at the end of Chapter 3, but 
I want to make it clear from the outset that my lack of explicit definition is 
deliberate. My claim is that to understand the nature of belief, we must care-
fully investigate our doxastic practices. 
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Some philosophers deny that their theories need to match up with our 
ordinary practices. Ordinary usage is complex and messy, and one of the 
aims of a theory, one may argue, is to offer clarity and precision about the 
phenomenon under investigation. That a theory shows that our common 
practice is fundamentally flawed is not always thought of as revealing 
a problem with the theory. 
I agree that if, in the course of our investigation, we discover confusion or 
even inconsistency, then some revision makes sense. In a discussion of how 
epistemology can be naturalized, Hilary Kornblith discusses the interplay 
between pre-theoretical observations and scientific description. He imagines 
a rock collector gathering samples of an interesting kind of stone for the 
purposes of trying to figure out what they have in common. 1 ~ Early on 
in this investigation, the collector may have some ideas of what kind of rock 
this is but as his theoretical understanding increases, he may find that some 
of the rocks he initially thought were examples of the kind of rock in ques-
tion turn out not to be so. Kornblith argues that our pre-reflective intuitions 
about knowledge (or belief) are based on a certain amount of understand-
ing but that we can come to revise these views as our understanding of the 
phenomena increases. 
Although I try as much as possible to avoid entering the debate between 
naturalists and their opponents, I do think a better, deeper understanding of 
any subject will likely change one's pre-reflective view. 19 But when a philo-
sophical account is revisionist and asks us to restrict usage (as we shall see 
is the case with many of the evidentialist views we will look at), we need 
a good motivation to do so. If the account, for example, has great explana-
tory power, then the restriction may be worth it. But if the restriction's 
only purpose is to allow one's theory to be consistent, then I question its 
worth. If we end up with a consistent theory that describes a phenomenon 
bearing little resemblance to our ordinary practice, what has been illumi-
nated? One of my guiding assumptions when evaluating theories of dox-
astic norms and agency is that they should help to illuminate our doxastic 
practices. I take it as a strike against a view if it deviates too much from 
our ordinary practices; I realize this is not an assumption everyone shares. 
4. STRUCTURE AND CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
This book is divided into two main parts, "Doxastic Norms" and "Doxastic 
Responsibility." In Part I, I review and critique a number of defenses of 
evidentialism before turning to my argument that the norms for belief are ulti-
mately practical. In Chapter 1, I consider various accounts in which a proper 
understanding of the concept of belief reveals the truth of evidentialism. 
Despite the differences in detail among these accounts, they all agree that 
a belief is correct if and only if it is true, and that it is impossible for us to form 
beliefs without good reasons or evidence for these beliefs being true. I think 
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both these claims can be questioned, and that none of these defenses succeed 
in showing that practical reasons for belief are conceptually impossible. 
In Chapter 2, I consider the view that although it is not impossible to 
believe for practical reasons, it is always wrong to do so. Following evidential 
norms, According to this view, the way to promote epistemic values such as 
truth, knowledge, or rationality. Those who offer this kind of defense may 
agree that there are times when holding a non-evidentially based belief is 
not prudentially or morally wrong, but that evidentialism is concerned only 
with what one ought to believe from an epistemic point of view. I argue that 
this separation of evaluative domains is problematic, and that the only way to 
make sense of epistemic value is to link it or ground it in the practical. 
In Chapter 3, I defend my pragmatist view of doxastic norms. The value of 
truth and knowledge is instrumental; having true beliefs helps us achieve our 
goals, flourish, and be excellent human beings. It is thus possible that some 
beliefs can help us achieve these goals independently of their truth-value, or 
of their being evidentially based. But truth and knowledge are so highly valu-
able that engaging in practices that lead away from truth and knowledge is 
problematic in every sense-prudentially, morally, and epistemically. It will, 
thus, only be permissible to hold non-evidentially based beliefs if doing so 
does not allow for practices that undermine truth. This chapter also consid-
ers a number of objections and implications of my view, including a discus-
sion of what this view reveals about the nature of belief. 
Those who oppose this pragmatist conception of doxastic norms will 
point out that, given the involuntary nature of belief, we cannot believe for 
practical reasons. This is why a discussion of doxastic norms is intertwined 
with the issue of doxastic control and responsibility. Part II focuses on these 
issues; I argue that beliefs are products of our agency, something we have an 
active role in shaping and maintaining. In Chapter 4, I introduce a tension 
in ordinary thinking about belief and consider two responses to what I call 
"the puzzle of doxastic responsibility" that I reject. Briefly, the puzzle is 
as follows: while much of what we believe is beyond our control, belief 
is also open to normative assessment; we hold each other responsible for 
our beliefs. But it seems that such lack of control should exempt us from 
responsibility and judgment. 
One can respond, on one hand, by arguing that we can effectively decide 
to believe or, on the other, by arguing that we are, in fact, not responsible for 
beliefs and that our common practices of attributions of responsibility are 
misguided. I reveal deep problems with both these approaches. Chapter 5 
engages with the third, and currently most common, response to the puzzle, 
which argues that although we lack voluntary control over our beliefs, we 
can nonetheless be held responsible for them. In Chapter 6, I turn to my 
own response to the puzzle. I argue that if we want to hold people respon-
sible for their beliefs, then there must be a sense in which we have control 
over them. Although we cannot believe at will, neither are we passive in the 
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beliefs we form and maintain. We take responsibility for our beliefs, and 
taking responsibility includes taking control of them. 
The two parts of the book are two sides of the same coin. That the norms 
of agency apply to both belief and action demands that we can make sense 
of doxastic agency. And that we can exercise control in the doxastic realm 
naturally leads to the view that the same norms guide both action and belief. 
NOTES 
1. One could be an evidentialist and think there are no positive duties to believe 
but instead only norms of permissibility. If this is so, it may seem that one has 
no answer to the question "what ought I to believe?" But even if the norms 
only dictate how not to believe, this answers the positive question to some 
extent. I ought to believe only those propositions that are not ruled out. 
2. Jonathan Adler's book on this topic is titled Belief's Own Ethics. One of his 
central contentions is that it is a mistake to appeal to "normative notions" in 
assessing what to believe. He refers to such approaches as "extrinsic," and he 
argues that this notion is based on a faulty assumption, namely that the con-
cept of belief alone does not fix the ethics of belief. Beliefs, thus, have their 
own "ethics," discovered by a clear analysis of the concept of belief. Many 
defenses of evidentialism in the last decade have followed Adler in adopting 
what he calls the "intrinsic" approach, namely focusing on how we must 
believe given what "belief" means. These defenses are the topic of Chapter 1. 
3. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 8. 
4. The first extensive discussion of the view that beliefs aim at truth is found in 
Bernard Williams's "Deciding to Believe" in Problems of Self. His discussion 
and some more recent accounts will be discussed in Chapter 1. 
5. That we cannot choose what is true may be overstating the point. In certain 
matters, matters that are up to us, there is a sense in which I can choose what 
is true. Berislav Marusic argues for this view in "Belief and Difficult Action." I 
will return to the question of what kind of control one has over belief in Part II. 
I will discus, in more detail, how the truth aim is supposed to explain why we 
cannot believe at will in Chapter 1. 
6. Virtue of character, Aristotle says, is about feelings and actions. A virtuous 
person will have "feelings at the right times, about the right things, toward 
the right people, for the right end, and in the right way." Aristotle, Nicoma-
chean Ethics, 24. 
7. For example, in the first chapter of Belief's Own Ethics where he defends his 
strong version of evidentialism, Adler begins by saying, "Evidentialism, an 
ethics of belief advocated by David Hume, John Locke, W.K. Clifford, and 
many others" (5). 
8. Hume, Concerning Human Understanding, 170. 
9. David Owen argues that Hume's preference for reason has a moral ground. 
He says, "the moral approval we feel towards the wise and reasonable per-
son, on the grounds that the characteristics of that sort are pleasing and 
useful to their possessors and others, is the ultimate ground of Hume's pref-
erence for reason" (Owen, Hume's Reason, 220). He is one of the few to 
engage with the question as to why Hume prefers the ways of the wise. This 
is the central question that I engage with in "Why Should We Be Wise?" 
10. Hume, Concerning the Principles of Morals, 268. 
